We introduce a new approach to conditional probability over many-valued events, which is based on bets. Then we show that this approach fits with Kroupa's approach, and we give two characterizations of coherence for books on conditional many-valued events, the first one based on states, and the second one based on logical coherence of a suitable theory on many-valued logic.
Introduction
In [7] and [8] , de Finetti suggested a new approach to foundations of probability: the probability of an event φ (whose outcome is unknown now and will be known later) is the amount of money a that a rational and reversible bookmaker (called Ada in the sequel) would propose for the following bet: a bettor (called Blaise in the sequel) bets a (possibly negative) real number k and pays ka to Ada now (if k < 0, then he gets −ka from Ada). If φ will be true, then he will get back k from Ada (if k < 0, then he will pay −k to Ada), and if φ will be false, then he will get nothing. Ada may accept bets on different events φ 1 ,...,φ n . In this case, she chooses a finite set α = {(φ 1 ,a 1 ),...,(φ n ,a n )}, where for i = 1,...,n, φ i is an event and a i is the amount of money that Ada chooses for a bet on φ i of the form described above. Such a finite set α is called a book. In the sequel, we write (φ 1 ,a 1 ),...,(φ n ,a n ) instead of {(φ 1 ,a 1 ),...,(φ n ,a n )}. If for i = 1,...,n, Blaise bets k i on φ i , and the truth value of φ i is v(φ i ), then Ada's payoff will be n i=1 k i (a i −v(φ i )). There are two different notions of coherence for a book α. One can define a book α coherent iff there is a probability measure Pr such that, for i = 1,...,n, Pr(φ i ) = a i . This notion of coherence will be called probabilistic coherence. Alternatively, one can define a book α coherent iff there is no system of bets k 1 ,...,k n on φ 1 ,...,φ n , respectively, which leads Blaise to a win, independently of the outcome of the events φ 1 ,...,φ n , i.e. there is no string k 1 ,...,k n of real numbers such that for every valuation v Ada's payoff n i=1 k i (a i −v(φ i )) is negative. This notion of coherence will be called de Finetti coherence.
As shown by de Finetti [8] , these criteria of coherence are mutually equivalent. In [20] , Mundici introduces a many-valued analogue to the notion of probability distribution, e.i. the notion of state on an MV-algebra. Then in [22] , he investigates an alternative approach, in the style of de Finetti, to probability over many-valued events. Given a book α = (φ 1 ,a 1 ),...,(φ n ,a n ), the rules of the game are as before, with the only difference that φ 1 ,...,φ n are now events represented by formulas of Łukasiewicz logic and can take values in the real interval [0,1]. Thus, for i = 1,...,n, Blaise pays k i a i now and gets back k i v(φ i ), where v(φ i ) is the truth value of φ i . Once again, Ada's payoff is n i=1 k i (a i −v(φ i )). Mundici [22] proved the following.
Proposition 1.1
Let α = (φ 1 ,a 1 ),...,(φ n ,a n ) be a book over events represented by formulas of Łukasiewicz logic. The following are equivalent:
(1) There is a state s on the Lindenbaum algebra of Łukasiewicz logic such that, denoting, for i = 1,...,n, by [φ i ] the equivalence class of φ i modulo provable equivalence, one has s([φ 1 ]) = a 1 ,...,s([φ n ]) = a n . (2) There is no system of bets k 1 ,...,k n on φ 1 ,...,φ n such that for every valuation v, Ada's payoff n i=1 k i (a i −v(φ i )) is negative. Proposition 1.1 solves a problem of Paris [25] . One may wonder if there is a similar approach to conditional probability. In [14] , Kroupa introduces conditional probability by means of probabilistic operator Pr satisfying the principle Pr(φ|ψ)·Pr(ψ) = Pr(φ ·ψ), where · denotes product conjunction (cf also [16] ). This approach has some good properties, like the additivity of the operator Pr(φ|ψ) for ψ fixed (assuming that Pr(ψ) > 0), but it also has some rather unexpected properties. For instance, unlike the case of classical probability, Pr(φ|φ) need not be equal to 1, and Pr(φ|∼φ) (where ∼ denotes Łukasiewicz negation) need not be equal to 0. Moreover, this approach leaves the truth value of Pr(φ|ψ) undetermined when Pr(ψ) = 0.
In [23] , Mundici introduces a notion of conditional probability which avoids these rather counterintuitive situations. Indeed, the author defines, for every consistent theory T over Łukasiewicz logic, a state s T on the Lindenbaum algebra of T which is faithful (i.e. s T ([φ]) = 0 implies [φ]=0) and invariant under MV-automorphism. In this way, for each event ψ, if the set 1 ψ of valuations v such that v(ψ) = 1 is non-empty, then one can obtain a relativized state s ψ on the Lindenbaum algebra of Łukasiewicz logic plus ψ and then one can define the conditional probability Pr(φ|ψ) of φ given ψ as Pr(φ|ψ) = s ψ ([φ] ). Interestingly, s ψ is defined even if the Lebesgue measure of 1 ψ is zero, provided that 1 ψ =∅. This approach has several good properties. For instance, invariance under automorphism is a natural property for a measure. On the other hand, according to Kroupa's approach, it is possible to define the conditional probability of φ given ψ even when 1 ψ =∅, provided that Pr(ψ) > 0.
Finding a counterpart of invariance in terms of bets is an interesting open problem which we have been not able to solve. If we disregard invariance, then the interpretation in terms of bets corresponding to Mundici's approach seems to be the following: given a book (φ|ψ,a|b) where φ and ψ are formulas of Łukasiewicz logic and a|b is a real number in [0,1], Blaise bets a real number k on φ|ψ with the agreement that: (i) he pays k ·a|b to Ada now; (ii) let v(ψ) and v(φ) denote the truth values of φ and ψ, respectively. Then, if the truth value v(ψ) = 1, Blaise will get back kv(φ) from Ada; otherwise, the bet is invalidated, i.e. Blaise will get back k from Ada. According to this interpretation, there is an asymmetry between the treatment of φ, which is considered as a many-valued and the treatment of ψ, which is treated as a crisp event. As a consequence, Ada's payoff function, which is equal to 0 if v(ψ) < 1 and to k(a|b−v(φ)) otherwise, is continuous with respect to v(φ) but not with respect to v(ψ). This is plausible, because φ and ψ play different roles in φ|ψ. However, we believe that the alternative approach we are going to introduce is closer to the spirit of many-valued logic.
We start from an example. Suppose that we are betting on the conditional event: the Barcelona soccer team will win the next match, provided that Messi plays. Then, it would not make sense to invalidate the bet if Messi plays the whole match except from the last 30 s. In our opinion, the many-valued way to interpret a bet on a conditional event φ|ψ is to think of it as a bet on φ which is valid with degree v(ψ). Thus, e.g. if v(ψ) = 1, the bet is completely valid, if v(ψ) = 0, the bet is invalidated, and if v(ψ) = 1/2, then only one-half of the bet is valid. In this way, if Ada's book on the conditional event φ|ψ is (φ|ψ,a|b) with a|b ∈[0,1] and if Blaise bets a real number k on φ|ψ, then Ada's payoff according to the valuation v will be kv(ψ)(a|b−v(φ)), i.e. her payoff corresponding to the book (φ,a|b) multiplied by the degree v(ψ) of validity of the bet. More generally, given a book α = (φ 1 |ψ 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ) ,...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ), (χ 1 ,c 1 ) ,...,(χ m ,c m ) on conditional and unconditional events, if Blaise bets k i on φ i |ψ i (i = 1,...,n) and r j on χ j (j = 1,...,m), then Ada's payoff relative to the valuation v is
According to this approach, it is natural to define α to be de Finetti coherent iff for every system k 1 ,...,k n ,r 1 ,...,r m of bets on the events
there is a valuation v such that Ada's payoff is non-negative. Somewhat surprisingly, the counterpart of this coherence criterion in terms of probabilistic operators corresponds to Kroupa's definition of conditional probability, and not to Mundici's definition.
In this article, we investigate the above defined notion of de Finetti coherence for books on conditional and unconditional events. We present two equivalent characterizations of it: the first one is in terms of states over MV-algebras with product, and the second one is in terms of logical coherence of a suitable theory over the probabilistic many-valued logic SPMV + which will be defined in the sequel. It will follow from these characterizations that the coherence problem for books whose values a i |b i , i = 1,...,n and c j , j = 1,...,m are rational, is in PSPACE.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with preliminaries; in Section 3, we first prove that the only notion of many-valued conditional probability operator which corresponds to de Finetti coherence is the one defined by Kroupa in [14] . Then we introduce the notion of complete book and we prove that a book α = (φ 1 |ψ 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ),...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ),(χ 1 ,c 1 ),...,(χ m ,c m )
can be extended to a complete de Finetti coherent book iff there is a state s on the Lindenbaum algebra of Łukasiewicz logic with product such that for i = 1,...,n and for
if this is the case, we say that α is probabilistically coherent).
Finally, in Section 4, we introduce a probabilistic logic over Łukasiewicz logic with product, called SPMV + , and we associate to each book α a finitely axiomatizable theory T α such that SPMV + ∪T α is coherent iff α is probabilistically coherent.
Preliminaries
For basic notions of Universal Algebra, the reader is referred to [2] . We will work in the framework of abstract algebraic logic, cf [1] . Thus, n-ary connectives are identified with n-ary operations and formulas are identified with terms. Unless specified otherwise, a valuation of formulas of a propositional logic L into an algebra A of the same type is defined to be a homomorphism from the algebra of formulas of L into A.
The logics used in this article are algebraizable in the sense of [1] . Indeed, any such logic L has a binary connective ↔ and a constant 1 such that the relation ≡ defined by φ ≡ ψ iff L φ ↔ ψ is a congruence of the algebra of formulas, and the theorems of L are precisely those formulas φ such that φ ≡ 1. Thus, we can construct the Lindenbaum algebra of L, i.e. the quotient of the algebra of formulas modulo ≡. In the sequel, the equivalence class determined by the formula φ will be denoted by [φ] , and the Lindenbaum algebra of a logic L will be denoted by L L .
In this way, the quasivariety V L generated by L L is the equivalent algebraic semantics of L. Given a formula φ and an equation ε of the form ψ = ζ, φ e denotes the equation φ = 1 and ε f denotes the formula ψ ↔ ζ. Moreover, given a set of formulas and a set of equations, e denotes the set {φ e : φ ∈ } and f denotes the set ε f : ε ∈ . Then we have:
In particular, L is strongly complete with respect to V L . This means that for every non-empty set ∪{φ} of formulas of L, we have L φ iff for every algebra A ∈ V L and for every valuation
Łukasiewicz logic, denoted by Ł in the sequel, seems to be the most adequate many-valued logic for a logical treatment of probability. Indeed, first of all, one can express in it the additivity of probability measures. Moreover, Ł is the only t-norm logic whose connectives are continuous. However, since the payoff formula in the case of conditional probability involves product, we will work in Łukasiewicz logic with product, denoted by PMV + in the sequel. We review the definitions and some basic facts about MV-algebras and Łukasiewicz logic, cf [12] and [5] .
The language of Ł has a binary connective → and the constant 0. The constant 1 is defined by 1 = 0 → 0 and the connectives ∼ and ⊕ are defined by ∼ φ = φ → 0 and φ ⊕ψ =∼ φ → ψ. The connectives , , ↔, ∧ and ∨ are defined as follows:
The axioms of Ł are:
The only rule of Ł is modus ponens:
The equivalent algebraic semantics of Ł in the sense of [1] is constituted by the class of MV-algebras. Instead of → and 0, these algebras have the binary operation ⊕, the unary operation ∼ and the constants 0 and 1 as primitives. The operations →, , , ↔, ∧ and ∨ are defined as follows:
An MV-algebra is an algebra (A,⊕,∼,0,1) such that:
Let A PMV + algebra is defined to be an algebra (A,⊕,∼,·,0,1) such that:
It follows from [18] that the class of PMV + algebras is the quasivariety generated by the algebra ([0,1],⊕,∼,·,0,1), where · denotes ordinary product. This algebra will be denoted by [0,1] PMV + .
In the sequel, the symbol · will be used to denote both product in the reals and product in PMV + algebras. This symbol will be sometimes omitted when there is no danger of confusion.
The logic PMV + corresponding to the class of PMV + algebras, has the symbols of Ł plus a binary connective ·, representing product. Its axioms and rules are the following:
(PMV1 ) All axioms and rules of Ł.
It is easy to prove that the Lindenbaum algebra L PMV + of PMV + is isomorphic to the free PMV + algebra on countably many generators.
In any PMV + algebra, we define, for every natural number n, the operations (n)x, x (n) and x n by induction on n as follows: (0)x = 0 and x 0 = x (0) = 1; (n+1)x = (n)x ⊕x, x (n+1) = x (n) x and x n+1 = x n ·x. In a similar fashion we define, for every formula φ, the formulas (n)φ, φ (n) and φ n . In our framework, events are represented by PMV + formulas. However, since valuations do not distinguish pairs of provably equivalent formulas, we might also define events to be equivalence classes [φ] of formulas φ modulo provable equivalence, i.e. elements of L PMV + .
A filter of an MV-algebra, (PMV + algebra, respectively) A is a subset F of A such that 1 ∈ F and for all a,b,c,d
A filter is said to be proper if 0 / ∈ F, and maximal iff it is maximal among all proper filters. It can be proved that a proper filter M of an MV-algebra A is maximal if and only if, for all a ∈ A, either ∼ a ∈ M or there is a natural number n such that (n)a ∈ M. The set of all filters of A is denoted by F(A), and the set of all maximal filters of A is denoted by M(A). For every F ∈ F(A), C F denotes the set {M ∈ M(A) : F ⊆ M}. The hull kernel topology is the topology on M(A) whose closed sets are precisely the sets of the form C F for some F ∈ F(A).
In both MV and PMV + algebras, filters correspond to congruences: given a congruence θ, the set F θ = {x : (x,1) ∈ θ} is a filter, and given a filter F, the set {(x,y) : x ↔ y ∈ F} is a congruence. Moreover, the maps θ → F θ and F → θ F are mutually inverse isomorphisms between the congruence lattice and the filter lattice of an MV (PMV + , respectively) algebra. The quotient of A modulo the congruence θ F determined by a filter F is indifferently denoted by A/θ F or by A/F, and the equivalence class of an element a modulo θ F is indifferently denoted by a/θ F or by a/F.
A filter F is maximal iff A/F is a simple algebra, i.e. its only congruences are {(a/F,a/F) : a ∈ A} and A/F ×A/F. We recall [5] that an MV-algebra A is simple iff it can be embedded into [0,1] MV ; in this case, the embedding is unique. The same result can be proved for PMV + algebras, because there is only one operation (ordinary product) on [0,1] MV which makes it into a PMV + algebra.
An MV (PMV + , respectively) algebra is said to be semisimple iff it is isomorphic to a subdirect product of simple MV (PMV + , respectively) algebras. Thus, every semisimple MV-algebra (PMV + algebra, respectively) has a subdirect embedding into a direct product of copies of [0,1] MV ([0,1] PMV + , respectively). It is well-known [5] that an MV-algebra (PMV + algebra, respectively) A is semisimple if and only if M(A) = {1}.
In [19] , it is shown that a PMV + algebra and its MV reduct have the same congruences. However, if A is a PMV + algebra and F is a filter of A, then A/F need not be a PMV + algebra, as the quasiequation x 2 = 0 ⇒ x = 0 is not preserved under quotients. It is easy to prove that A/F is a PMV + algebra iff whenever ∼ a 2 ∈ F, then ∼ a ∈ F.
In the sequel, we will often use the notion of state. 
Proposition 2.2 [15, 24]
For every state s on a semisimple MV-algebra A there is a unique Borel probability measure µ on M(A), with respect to the hull kernel topology, such that µ(M(A)) = 1 and for all a ∈ A one has
In fact, Panti also proved the converse of Proposition 2.2, i.e.
Proposition 2.3 [24]
Let A be any MV-algebra. Then for every Borel probability measure µ on M(A) such that µ(M(A)) = 1, there is a state s on A such that for all a ∈ A one has s(a) = M(A) f a dµ.
Remark 2.4
In some sense, the assumption that A is semisimple in Proposition 2.2 can be removed: let R =
M(A). Then A/R is semisimple, M(A) can be identified with M(A/R), and if a/R = b/R, then s(a) = s(b), and for all
Thus, in both sides of the formula s(a) = M(A) f a dµ we can replace A by A/R and a by a/R. However, if A is not semisimple, then the map a → f a is not one-one.
The notion of valuation and the notion of state can be generalized as follows, cf [17] . Let be a set of continuous operations (of finite, but arbitrary, arity) on 
Definition 2.5 A Borel state on A is a map s from A into [0,1] such that there is a probability Borel probability measure µ on H(A) such that for all a ∈ A one has: s(a) = H(A) f a dµ.
We conclude this section with a generalization of the concept of de Finetti coherence and with the statement of a fundamental result of Kühr and Mundici. a 1 ) ,...,(φ n ,a n ), where φ 1 ,...,φ n ∈ A and a 1 ,...,a n are real numbers in [0,1]. Moreover, α is said to be de Finetti coherent iff for every finite sequence k 1 ,...,k n of reals, there is a homomorphism
Clearly our previous notion of de Finetti coherence for books on unconditional PMV + events occurs as a particular case when [0,1] =[0,1] PMV + and A is the countably generated free PMV + algebra. In [17] , Kühr and Mundici prove the following very general result. a 1 ) ,...,(φ n ,a n ) be as in Definition 2.6. The following are equivalent:
(1) α is de Finetti coherent. 
de Finetti coherence and probabilistic coherence
We begin this section with a proof that Kroupa's approach is the only approach which fits with our definition of de Finetti coherence for books on conditional and unconditional many-valued events. 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ) ,...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ),(χ 1 ,c 1 ),...,(χ m ,c m ), the following are equivalent:
(a) α is de Finetti coherent. (b) There is Pr ∈ P such that for i = 1,...,n and for j = 1,...,m we have Pr(φ i |ψ i ) = a i |b i and Pr(χ j ) = c j .
Then for every Pr ∈ P, the following conditions hold:
(1) The map s Pr on (the MV reduct of) L PMV + defined by s Pr ([φ]) = Pr(φ) is well defined and is a state on L PMV + . (2) For every pair φ,ψ of events, we have Pr(φ ·ψ) = Pr(φ|ψ)·Pr(ψ).
Proof. Claim (1) is an easy consequence of Proposition 2.7. As regards to claim (2) , suppose that Pr(φ ·ψ) = Pr(φ|ψ)·Pr(ψ). Let a * b = Pr(φ ·ψ), b = Pr(ψ) and a|b = Pr(φ|ψ), and consider the book α = (φ|ψ,a|b),(φ ·ψ,a * b),(ψ,b). We claim that α is not de Finetti coherent.
Suppose first b·(a|b) < a * b. Then if Blaise bets a|b on ψ, −1 on φ ·ψ and 1 on φ|ψ, for every valuation v, Ada's payoff is
It follows that α is not de Finetti coherent. By our assumption, Pr / ∈ P. Thus if Pr ∈ P, then Pr(φ ·ψ) = Pr(φ|ψ)·Pr(ψ).
on conditional and unconditional events is said to be probabilistically coherent iff there is a state s on the (MV reduct of)
A natural conjecture is the following:
Let α be a book. The following are equivalent:
(1) α is probabilistically coherent.
(2) α is de Finetti coherent.
We will prove Conjecture 3.3 in the case of complete books defined below.
is said to be complete if for i = 1,...,n there is a (unique) j such that χ j = ψ i . That is, α is complete iff whenever it includes a guess on φ i |ψ i , it also includes a guess on ψ i .
We consider first complete books in which Ada's booking b i for every conditioning event ψ i is positive. The idea is that in this case we can replace conditional bets on φ i |ψ i by simple bets on new formulas.
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Definition 3.5 Let α = (φ 1 |ψ 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ),...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ),...,(χ 1 ,c 1 ),...,(χ m ,c m ) be a complete book, and let b i be the probability assigned to ψ i (formally, for each i there is j such that χ j = ψ i ; then let b i = c j ). Suppose 
It is easy to prove that the Lindenbaum algebra L PMV α + of PMV α + is isomorphic to the countably generated free algebra in the quasivariety V α generated by [0,1] PMV α + . Moreover, the concept of de Finetti coherent book can be extended to PMV + α with reference to L PMV α + , cf Definition 2.6. Note also that if A is any algebra in V α , then A and its MV reduct have the same congruences. Thus, the space H(A) of all homomorphisms from A into [0,1] PMV α + with the Tychonoff topology is homeomorphic to the space M(A) of all maximal filters of (the MV reduct of) A with the hull kernel topology. It follows from Proposition 2.7 that a generalized book relative to PMV + α is de Finetti coherent iff it is probabilistically coherent.
..,n), etc., be as in Definition 3.5. The following are equivalent: Suppose that α is not de Finetti coherent, and let k 1 ,...,k n ,r 1 ,...,r m be a system of bets for Blaise, corresponding to the book α, which leads Blaise to a win independently of the valuation. Consider the following system of bets:
• If for every i, ψ i = χ j , then Blaise bets r j on χ j .
Clearly, Ada's payoff relative to the events χ j such that for all i, χ j = ψ i is the same in α and α . Therefore, we can concentrate on the remaining events. It suffices to show that for i = 1,...,n, if j is the unique index such that χ j = ψ i , then for every valuation v, Ada's payoff relative to the bets k i on φ i |ψ i and r j on χ j = ψ i equals Ada's payoff relative to the bets Mk i b i = Mk i c j on d * i ·φ i ·ψ i and r j −k i (a i |b i ) on ψ i = χ j . Now the above payoffs are, respectively,
It follows that α is not de Finetti coherent.
Conversely, assume that α is not de Finetti coherent. Let k 1 ,...,k n ,r 1 ,...,r m be a system of bets relative to the book α which leads Blaise to a win independently of the valuation v. Consider the following system of bets relative to the book α:
• Blaise bets
on φ i |ψ i , where j is the unique index such that χ j = ψ i .
• If χ j = ψ i , then Blaise bets r j +
on ψ i = χ j . Now the above payoffs are, respectively,
as desired. It follows that if α is not de Finetti coherent, then α is not de Finetti coherent.
Theorem 3.7
Let α be as in Lemma 3.6. The following are equivalent:
(1) α is de Finetti coherent.
(2) α is probabilistically coherent.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, α is de Finetti coherent iff 
We now treat the more general case of arbitrary complete books. Let α = (φ 1 |ψ 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ) ,...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ), (χ 1 ,c 1 ) ,...,(χ m ,c m ) be a complete book. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ψ 1 ,...,ψ i have a positive probability assignment and ψ i+1 ,...,ψ n , have probability assignment equal to 0. 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ) ,...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ),(χ 1 ,c 1 ),...,(χ m ,c m ) be a complete book as specified above and let c 1 ) ,...,(χ m ,c m )
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Then:
(1) α is de Finetti coherent iff α is de Finetti coherent.
(2) α is probabilistically coherent iff α is probabilistically coherent. 
..,r m be any system of bets for Blaise relative to the book α. We claim that there is a j such that
To prove this, suppose, by way of contradiction, that for all j we have
Then letting for every formula φ,
However, (b) and (d) imply that the left-hand side of the expression above is equal to 0, which is a contradiction.
Thus, let j be such that
Thus, α is de Finetti coherent. 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ) ,...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ), (χ 1 ,c 1 
For an arbitrary book α, conditions (2) and (3) above are equivalent to
(1 ) α can be extended to a complete de Finetti coherent book.
Conjecture 3.10
We conjecture that every de Finetti coherent book extends to a complete and de Finetti coherent book. Clearly, Conjecture 3.10 would imply Conjecture 3.3.
As a corollary of Theorem 3.9, we present a proof of the following complexity result, which can also be derived from [13] :
The problem of deciding the probabilistic coherence of a book on conditional and unconditional events is in PSPACE.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, it suffices to prove that the problem of deciding if a book can be extended to a complete and de Finetti coherent book is in PSPACE. Now let α = (φ 1 |ψ 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ),...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ),(χ 1 ,c 1 ),...,(χ m ,c m ) be a book. We can assume without loss of generality that for i = 1,...,k (with k ≤ n) there is a (unique) j ≤ m such that ψ i = χ j and for all i > k and for all j ≤ m, 
Conditions (a-d) are equivalent to an existential formula in the language of the ordered real field, which can be computed from α in time polynomial in the size of α. Since validity of existential formulas in the real field is a PSPACE problem, the claim follows.
We conclude this section with a short investigation on independence of many-valued events. In classical probability theory, two events φ and ψ are said to be independent with respect to a probability distribution Pr if Pr(φ|ψ) = Pr(φ) and Pr(ψ|φ) = Pr(ψ) (if Pr(φ) = 0, then the second condition is redundant; furthermore, in this case independence is equivalent to the condition Pr(φ ·ψ) = Pr(φ)· Pr(ψ)). We want to discuss the following problem:
Given a set S of pairs of events, is it consistent to assume that each pair in S consists of independent events?
In order to state the problem formally, we propose the following definition. A book α is said to be independent relative to set S ={(φ i ,ψ i );i = 1,...,n} of pairs of events, iff for some a i ,b i ∈[0,1]:i = 1,...,n, α contains all pairs of the form
..,n. If in addition all a i ,b i are positive, then we say that α is strongly independent. In other words, α is independent relative to S iff for i = 1,...,n, Ada's bookings on φ i and φ i |ψ i , as well as ψ i and ψ i |φ i , are equal, and it is strongly independent if in addition the probability assignment to all φ i and ψ i is strictly positive. Now the formal counterpart of our problem is the following:
Given a finite set S of pairs of events, is there an independent de Finetti coherent book relative to S? And is there a strongly independent de Finetti coherent book relative to S?
In the next theorem we prove that the answer to the first question is always affirmative. However, this result is not informative, because it is due to the fact that the coherence criteria introduced in this article, as well as Kroupa's approach to conditional probability, work well only in the case of positive probabilities. Then, we give a sufficient condition for the existence of a strongly independent de Finetti coherent book relative to a finite set S of pairs of events. This condition is also necessary if S consists of exactly one pair of events.
Theorem 3.12
(1) For every finite set S ={(φ 1 ,ψ 1 ),...,(φ n ,ψ n )} of pairs of events there is a de Finetti coherent independent book relative to it. (2) Let S be as in (1), and assume that PMV +
Then there is a de Finetti coherent strongly independent book relative to S. (3) If S ={(φ,ψ)} has cardinality 1, then the existence of a de Finetti coherent strongly independent book relative to S is equivalent to the condition PMV + ∼ φ∨∼ψ.
Proof.
(1) Let v be any Boolean valuation, and define, for every element
is independent and probabilistically coherent. Hence, by Theorem 3.9, it is de Finetti coherent. (2) Recall that PMV + is strongly complete with respect to the class of PMV + algebras, and that the class of PMV + algebras is generated as a quasivariety by [0,1] + PMV , cf [18] . Hence, if
. It follows that letting, for i = 1,...,n, a i = v(φ i ) and
is strongly independent and probabilistically coherent. Therefore, by Theorem 3.9, it is also de Finetti coherent. (3) By (2), it is left to prove that if S ={(φ,ψ)} and PMV + ∼ φ∨∼ψ, then there is no strongly independent de Finetti coherent book relative to S. Indeed, a state s witnessing the probabilistic coherence of a strongly independent book relative to S would satisfy: 
Example
(1) A formula φ(p 1 ,...,p n ) is said to be positive iff PMV + φ(1,...,1). By Theorem 3.12, it follows that if φ 1 ,...,φ n are all positive, then there is a strongly independent de Finetti coherent book relative to the set of all pairs (φ i ,φ j ) : i,j = 1,...,n.
(2) By Theorem 3.12 again, for both pairs of formulas (p,p) and (p,∼ p), there is a strongly independent and de Finetti coherent book relative to it, while in classical probability such books do not exist.
(3) There is no strongly independent and de Finetti coherent book for the pair (p (2) ,(∼ p) (2) ), where p denotes a propositional variable.
SPMV-algebras and a logical and algebraic equivalent to probabilistic coherence
In [10] , the authors consider a logic, called SFP(Ł,Ł), for a purely algebraic treatment of probability over many-valued events. The langauge of SFP(Ł,Ł) has propositional variables p 1 ,...,p n , the propositional constant 1, Łukasiewicz connectives ⊕ and ∼ and an additional unary operator Pr. The axioms of SFP(Ł,Ł) are:
The rules of SFP(Ł,Ł) are modus ponens:
and Necessitation:
φ Pr(φ) . It can be shown that axiom (SFP5) is redundant, but we will keep it to simplify some proofs. In particular, using (SFP5) it is immediate to prove that SFP(Ł,Ł) is closed under substitution of equivalents.
The algebraic counterpart of SFP(Ł,Ł) is the variety of SMV-algebras. These algebras are MValgebras equipped with a unary operation Pr satisfying the following axioms: Note that the properties of Pr reflect the properties of a state, with the difference that Pr is a unary operation of the algebra and not a map from the algebra into [0,1]. The semantics based on SMValgebras allows us to interpret probabilistic formulas with nested occurrences of the probability operator Pr. In some cases, such formulas may be significant. In order to produce a good example, we recall that in [10] it is shown that in a subdirectly irreducible SMV-algebra (A,Pr), the operator Pr can be regarded as a non-standard integral taking values in a non-standard extension of [0,1]. In other words, the standard part of the operator Pr is an integral. If in addition A is a semisimple MV-algebra, then its elements can be regarded as real-valued functions f on [0,1] and of Pr(f ) can be regarded as an integral f dµ with respect to some probability Borel measure µ on [0,1]. Now consider the equation
Keeping in mind the above interpretation, this equation says that the sets
have the same area. This property constitutes a geometric interpretation of the mean value. The equation above is derivable from the defining equations of SMV-algebras, but it cannot be expressed in the language of either MV-algebras with a state or in Flaminio and Godo's [9] probabilistic logic FP(Ł,Ł). In spite of its expressive power, the language of SMV-algebras is not sufficient for the treatment of conditional probability as presented in the previous section. For the latter, we need a language with product. To this purpose we will introduce, on the logic side, an extension of the logic SFP(Ł,Ł) having an additional connective corresponding to product, and on the algebraic side a quasivariety consisting of SMV-algebras with product. The equation Pr(Pr(x)·y) = Pr(x)·Pr(y), together with additivity, reflects the linearity of integrals. Indeed, Pr(x) can be thought of as the integral of the function represented by x, which is a real number. Moreover, since x 2 is a convex function, the equation (Pr(x)) 2 ≤ Pr(x 2 ) reflects an instance of Jensen's inequality [11] .
Definition 4.3
The logic SPMV + corresponding to the quasivariety of SPMV + algebras is the logic whose language is the language of PMV + added with a unary operator Pr, and whose axioms and rules are those of SFP(Ł,Ł), those of PMV + , plus the axioms (SPMV + 3 ) Pr(φ ·Pr(ψ)) ↔ Pr(φ)·Pr(ψ) and (Pr(φ)) 2 → Pr(φ 2 ).
It is easy to prove that L SPMV + , the Lindenbaum algebra of SPMV + , is isomorphic to the countably generated free SPMV + algebra. It follows that SPMV + is strongly complete with respect to the class of SPMV + algebras.
We wish to express probabilistic coherence in terms of logical coherence (underivability of a contradiction) of a suitable finite set of sentences over SPMV + .
Let α = (φ 1 |ψ 1 ,a 1 |b 1 ),...,(φ n |ψ n ,a n |b n ),(χ 1 ,c 1 ),...,(χ m ,c m ) be a book such that for i = 1,...,n and for j = 1,...,m, a i |b i and c j are rational numbers. We can write a i |b i and c j as a i |b i = s i r and c j = t j r for suitable natural numbers r,s i and t j , with r > 0. We define ω 0 to be the formula (r − 1)p ↔∼ p, saying that the truth value of p is 1 r , and for i = 1,...,n we define ω i = Pr(φ i ·ψ i ) ↔ ((s i )p·Pr(ψ i )). Moreover, for j = 1,...,m we define ζ j = Pr(χ j ) ↔ ((t j )p). Finally, we define T α to be the set {ω 0 ,...,ω n ,ζ 1 ,...,ζ m }. We are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.4
The following are equivalent:
(1) α is probabilistically coherent. (2) SPMV + ∪T α is logically coherent.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.4. We will use several algebraic lemmas. (2) It follows from [19] that a PMV + algebra and its MV-reduct have the same congruences. Thus, a congruence of the SMV-reduct of A is compatible with product and it is a congruence of A.
If A is a subdirectly irreducible SPMV + algebra, then by Lemma 4.5 (2), its SMV reduct is subdirectly irreducible as well. Thus, by Proposition 4.1, Pr(A) is totally ordered.
We warn the reader that if A is an SPMV + algebra and θ is a congruence of A, then the quotient A/θ need not be an SPMV + algebra.
In the sequel, L − PMV + denotes the MV-reduct of L PMV + . We also recall the definition of tensor product A⊗B of two MV-algebras A and B, cf [21] . A bimorphism from the direct product A×B of A and B into an MV-algebra C is a map β from A×B into C such that: The tensor product of two MV-algebras A and B is an MV-algebra A⊗B for which there is a bimorphism ⊗ from A×B into A⊗B with the following universal property:
For every bimorphism β from A×B into an MV-algebra C there is a unique homomorphism h from A⊗B into C such that for all (a,b) ∈ A×B, h(a⊗b) = β(a,b).
As shown in [21] , the tensor product of two MV-algebras always exists and is unique up to isomorphism. Thus, we can call it the tensor product and not just a tensor product. In [21] , it is also proved that the maps a → a⊗1 and b → 1⊗b are embeddings of A and of B, respectively, into A⊗B. 
and it is left to prove that d ·h − (w) = b·h − (y) c·h − (z). But this is immediate: Proof. Since L PMV + is semisimple, by Proposition 2.2, there is a Borel probability measure µ
Now f a can be thought of as a random variable and s(a) can be thought of as its expected value E(f a ). Thus, by Jensen's inequality [11] , for every convex function h on the reals, we have h(E(f a )) ≤ E(h(f a )). Taking h(x) = x 2 we get the claim. 
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Moreover using Lemma 4.8, we get:
and the claim is settled.
We are ready to prove one direction of Theorem 4.4. Moreover, it is readily seen that for every ψ ∈ T α we have v(ψ) = 1⊗1. It follows that T α has a model which is an SPMV + algebra. Therefore, SPMV + ∪T a is coherent.
We are going to prove the other direction of Theorem 4.4. A Pr filter (called σ filter in [10] ) of an SPMV + algebra is an MV filter which is closed under Pr. Moreover, in [10] , it is shown that the lattice of Pr filters of an SMV-algebra is isomorphic to the lattice of its congruences. By Lemma 4.5, this result extends to SPMV + algebras as well. An SPMV + filter of an SPMV + algebra A is a Pr filter F of A such that for all a ∈ A, if ∼(a 2 ) ∈ F, then ∼a ∈ F. It is easy to prove that F is an SPMV + filter iff the quotient of A/F is an SPMV + algebra.
Lemma 4.11
Let A be an SPMV + algebra, let M be a maximal filter of Pr(A) and let M + = {x ∈ A : Pr(x) ∈ M}. Then M + is an SPMV + filter of A, and M + ∩Pr(A) = M.
Proof. That M + ∩Pr(A) = M follows from the fact that Pr(Pr(x)) = Pr(x). We prove that M + is an SPMV + filter. That 1 ∈ M + and that M + is upwards closed is clear. Moreover, if x,y ∈ M + , then Pr(x) Pr(y) ∈ M, and since Pr(x) Pr(y) ≤ Pr(x y), we have that Pr(x y) ∈ M, whence x y ∈ M + . Finally Pr(0) = 0 / ∈ M, whence 0 / ∈ M + . It follows that M + is a proper filter. If x ∈ M + , then Pr(x) ∈ M and Pr(Pr(x)) = Pr(x) ∈ M. Thus, Pr(x) ∈ M + and M + is a Pr filter. If ∼x 2 ∈ M + , then Pr(∼x 2 ) ∈ M. Since (Pr(x)) 2 ≤ Pr(x 2 ), Pr(∼x 2 ) =∼(Pr(x 2 )) ≤∼((Pr(x)) 2 ). Thus, ∼((Pr(x)) 2 ) ∈ M. We claim that ∼Pr(x) = Pr(∼x) ∈ M. If not, the maximality of M yields that for some natural number n we have (n)Pr(x) ∈ M. It follows that (n 2 )(Pr(x)) 2 ∈ M, because (n 2 )(Pr(x)) 2 = ((n)Pr(x)) 2 and filters are closed under product. But this contradicts our assumption that ∼((Pr(x)) 2 ) ∈ M. Thus, Pr(∼x) ∈ M, ∼x ∈ M + and M + is an SPMV + filter, as desired.
The other direction of Theorem 4.4 is contained in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.12
If SPMV + ∪T α is logically coherent, then α is probabilistically coherent.
Proof. If SPMV + ∪T α is logically coherent, then by the strong completeness of SPMV + with respect to the class of SPMV + algebras, there is an SPMV + algebra A and a valuation v into A such that for all ψ ∈ T α , v(ψ) = 1. Now let M be a maximal filter of Pr(A) and let M + be as in Lemma 4.11. Then A/M + is a non-trivial SPMV + algebra and the MV reduct of Pr(A)/M is a simple and nontrivial MV-algebra. Therefore, Pr(A)/M is isomorphic to (and will be identified with) a subalgebra 
Conclusions and open problems
We have introduced a new concept of coherence for conditional probability over many-valued events, called de Finetti coherence, and we have compared it with Mundici's approach to conditional probability as presented in [23] . Then, we have proved two different characterizations of de Finetti coherence, the first one in terms of states on MV-algebras, the second one in terms of logical coherence of a finitely axiomatizable theory over the logic SPMV + . The new concept deserves further investigations, and the present paper suggests some open problems. Here, are some of them:
(1) Prove or disprove Conjecture 3.3.
(2) Is the quasivariety of SPMV + -algebras generated by the class of all SMPV + algebras A such that the MV reduct of Pr(A) is a subalgebra of [0,1] MV ? (3) What is the computational complexity of the logic SPMV + ? (4) As said in Section 1, our notion of de Finetti coherence works well only if the conditioning events have positive probability. For instance, the book (p ∼p|q,1),(q,0), where p and q are propositional variables, is de Finetti coherent, but it is questionable whether it can be considered a rational book. One may justify this book arguing that Ada is so confident that q will have truth value 0 that she is ready to accept any bet on events conditioned by q. However, even in that case, a book like (p ∼p|q,0),(q,0) seems to be more safe than the previous one. Thus, an interesting open problem is to find an extension of SMPV + which is suitable for the treatment of conditional probability even in the case where the conditioning event has probability 0, and to propose a counterpart of it in terms of bets. A possible way to attack this problem would be to extend the method of layers (cf [6] ) to many-valued events.
